

Integrating Domestic and International Safeguards in Emerging Nuclear Power States

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August 2011
INMM Vienna Chapter
PNNL-SA-72097


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Summary


- ▶ The IAEA and Member States are increasingly engaged in cooperative efforts to help strengthen safeguards systems of emerging nuclear power States
- ▶ These cooperative efforts and applicable international guidance sometimes blur the distinction between international safeguards and domestic safeguards
- ▶ As a result, the important functions of domestic safeguards (other than physical protection) are sometimes overlooked
- ▶ More explicit attention to domestic safeguards in international guidance and cooperative efforts would help ensure that the national safeguards systems of emerging nuclear power States are comprehensive and effective


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Key distinction in IAEA SSAC Guidelines

- ▶ A national safeguards system typically has both an international objective –
 - To provide the essential basis for application of IAEA Safeguards
- ▶ As well as a national objective –
 - To account for and control nuclear material in the State and to help detect possible losses or unauthorized use or removal of nuclear material





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Distinction sometimes blurred in guidance and international cooperation

- ▶ *IAEA Milestones Document*
 - Milestones for safeguards include only international safeguards
 - Milestones for security and physical protection do not address MC&A
- ▶ *IAEA Nuclear Law Handbook*
 - Chapter on safeguards deals only with international safeguards
 - Chapter on physical protection does not discuss MC&A
- ▶ Similar issues in cooperative efforts




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Benefits of greater attention to domestic safeguards in cooperation and guidance

- ▶ Only requirements of a national safeguards system that are necessary for the application of IAEA safeguards must be verified or agreed to by the IAEA
- ▶ A national system designed solely to implement IAEA safeguards may not fully meet the objectives of domestic safeguards to prevent and detect loss, theft, or diversion of nuclear material by individuals, including insiders
- ▶ Cooperation with emerging nuclear power states should address safeguards comprehensively to help ensure a complete and appropriate infrastructure for the safe, secure, peaceful and efficient application of nuclear energy (per the *Milestones Document*)



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Scope of international & domestic safeguards


	International Safeguards	Domestic Safeguards
Purpose	Verify international nonproliferation commitments	Protect nuclear material
Threat	State with jurisdiction over nuclear material and activities	Sub-state actors (could be directed by another State)
Means	Material accountancy, containment/surveillance, strengthened safeguards measures	Material control and accounting; physical protection
Responsible parties	IAEA, State, facilities, persons required to report under Additional Protocol	State, facilities
Key international drivers	NPT, Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements or Voluntary Offer Agreements, Additional Protocol	UNSCR 1540

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Possible reasons for lesser emphasis on domestic safeguards

- ▶ In international cooperative efforts, the national actions to implement international safeguards may sometimes be equated with domestic safeguards
- ▶ Major high-level components of national infrastructures to implement international and domestic safeguards are essentially the same – e.g.,
 - Legislative and regulatory framework
 - National safeguards authority
 - National MC&A information system
 - Specific MC&A requirements for operators
- ▶ Most of the specific requirements for facility operators that are undertaken for international safeguards purposes also support domestic safeguards

Commonalities and distinctive elements



* Domestic safeguards may have similar requirements

Conclusions

- ▶ International guidance and cooperation:
 - Should be clear as to complementary objectives of international and domestic safeguards
 - Should specifically address additional elements of a national safeguards system that are necessary for domestic safeguards
 - Should follow graded approach
 - Should encourage single integrated national safeguards system for emerging nuclear power States

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Questions?

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